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I. Introduction
During the past decade, Canada has seen a dramatic rise in securities class action law-
suits.1 The vast majority of these lawsuits have been filed in Ontario,2 the location of
Canada's principal public securities market, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX).3 The
most likely explanation for this development is the enactment of section 138 of the Onta-
rio Securities Act in 2005, otherwise known as Bill 198.4
Section 138 (entitled "Civil Liability for Secondary Market Disclosure") amended the
Ontario Securities Act by providing aggrieved investors who purchased or sold securities
in the secondary trading market an avenue to sue companies and others responsible, in-
cluding directors and officers, for alleged materially false or misleading statements.5 The
section 138 amendments thus "established a statutory civil liability regime for misrepre-
sentation and omission in a public company's continuous disclosure."6 The amendments,
which provide a number of advantages for investor-plaintiffs to recover damages, have
generated a significant rise in the number of securities class actions.7
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1. BRADLEY A. HEYS, MARK L. BERENBLUT & JACOB DWHYTIE, TRENDS IN CANADIAN SECURITIES
CLASS ACTIONS: 2013 UPDATE; FILING STEADY, LAW IN FLUX, AND SETTLEMENTS ON THE RISE, 2 (2014)
[hereinafter NERA 2013]. For example, in 2011, a record fifteen securities class actions were filed. Id. See
generally Marc I. Steinherg, International Securities Law A Contemporary and Comparative Perspective (1999).
2. NERA 2013, supra note 1, at 4. As in previous years, the large majority of cases (eight out of ten) were
filed in Ontario.
3. MARC I. STEINBERG, FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ & ERIc C. CHAFFEE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN SECURITIES
LAW 38 (2013); Contact Us, TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE, (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.tnix.com/en/about
tsx/contact us.html.
4. See generally Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.); BRADLEY A. HEYS & MARK
L. BERENBLUT. TRENDS IN CANADIAN CLASS ACTIONS: 2011 UPDATE; PACE OF FILINGS GROWS, PACE OF
SETTLEMENT SLOWS (2012) [hereinafter NERA 2011].
5. See generally Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.3 (Can.).
6. Mark Gelowirz, Court Certifies Class Action Against Imax, THE LAWYER'S WEEKLY (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid= 1103.
7. NERA 2011, supra note 4, at 6.
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The impact of the Section 138 amendments thus largely explains the rise in class ac-
tions, enabling investors in Ontario's secondary capital market to recover damages from
corporations and other responsible persons who engage in deficient disclosure. s In Ca-
nada, over ninety percent of capital market activity occurs in the secondary market;9
therefore, the ability of investors to seek recompense is dramatically more significant
under the secondary market than under the primary market civil liability provisions. 10
Included in the section 138 amendments are key provisions that facilitate recovery in
securities class actions." Key investor-friendly aspects of the amendments, for example,
include: the elements of reliance and loss causation need not be proven by the plaintiff; in
"core" documents,12 no scienter need be shown; in "core" documents, where there is a
material misrepresentation, the burden is placed on the responsible person(s) to establish
the conducting of a reasonable investigation and having a reasonable belief; the absence of
onerous pleading requirements; and the lifting of the ceiling on damages if the directors,
officers, and others responsible (except for the subject issuer) engage in knowing
misconduct.13
The investor-friendly provisions of section 138 of the Ontario Securities Act seem to
best explain why the number of securities class actions filed in that Province have signifi-
cantly increased. Recent case law has also contributed to the growing number of such
lawsuits. For example, in Silver v. Imax Corp.,'14 the court set forth a flexible standard for
class certification, thus facilitating the initiation of such actions.' 5 In this regard, the fol-
lowing section of this article provides illustrative data from Ontario to evidence the recent
growth of securities class action filings.
Thereafter, the article focuses on the section 138 amendments, including such provi-
sions as secondary market liability, certification of class status, and the monetary ceiling
on liability. Also, the article examines some key differences between the Ontario Securi-
ties Act and the United States Securities Exchange Act. Several of these differences ex-
plain why Section 138 may be viewed as providing investor-plaintiffs with a more
attractive framework, even for U.S. investors who may be able to invoke the Canadian
remedial framework.16
8. See generally Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.3 (Can.).
9. See A.C. Pritchard &Janis P. Sarra, Securities Class Actions Move North: A Doctrinal and Empirical Analy-
sis of Securities Class Actions in Canada, 47 ALBERTA L. REV. 881, 882 (2010).
10. Steinberg et al., supra note 3, at 139.
11. Id. at 138-139; Gelowirz, supra note 6.
12. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5., § 138.1 (Can.); "'Core documents' include a
prospectus, various circulars (such as a take-over bid circular), "management's discussion and analysis ...
animnal financial statements and an interim financial report [of the responsible issuer], [and] .. .such other
documents as may be prescribed by regulation for the purposes of this definition ...." Id.
13. See Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.3 (Can.); Court Certifies Class Action
Against Imax, supra note 6, at 2; Berenblut see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
14. Silver v. Imax Corp. (2009), 105 O.R. 3d 212 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.).
15. Id. The Court in Imax held that the Ontario Securities Act set a relatively low threshold for plaintiffs
seeking leave to proceed with an action in court. Silver v. Imax Corp. (2009), 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 259 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (Leave to Appeal Decision), at T 25.
16. See, e.g., Abdula v. Canadian Solar Inc. (2012) 110 O.R. 3d 256 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (U.S. investors mem-
bers of securities class action instituted in Ontario).
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II. NERA Statistics
According to studies compiled by National Economic Research Associates (NERA), the
number of securities class action lawsuits filed in Canada has steadily increased since 2005.
Dozens of new securities class actions have been filed, many of which have been settled.17
From 1997 to 2007, there were between one and five class actions filed each year, far less
than the average of 9.5 claims filed in 2008 and 2009.18 As of year-end 2013, there are a
total of fifty-four active Canadian securities class actions, collectively making claims for
more than $19 billion (U.S.).' 9
According to a study compiled by NERA, eight new securities class action lawsuits were
filed in 2010, including six cases in Ontario. 20 As of 2010, there were twenty-eight active
Canadian securities class actions, representing more than $15.9 billion in total claims. 21
Twenty-five of these cases were instituted under the secondary market liability framework
of the Ontario Securities Act.22
In 2011, plaintiff-investors filed fifteen new securities class actions, twelve in Ontario,
including nine section 138 cases. 23 As of 2011, NERA reported that, out of the thirty-five
Ontario Bill 198 cases commenced, thirty-three were filed in Ontario.24 Within the 2011
report, NERA stated, "[i]n each of the last four years, we have seen at least nine new cases
filed-more than in any prior year. Not surprisingly, this trend has been driven by filings
of Section 138 cases, which account for more than two-thirds of the forty-six new cases
filed between 2008 and 2011.25
In 2012, Canadian plaintiff-investors filed a total of nine new securities class actions,
including eight class actions involving section 138 cases; each section 138 case was filed in
Ontario. 26 Although the total number of securities class actions filed in Canada decreased
from 2011 to 2012, the number of section 138 class actions filed in Ontario remained
similar to previous years, significantly higher than for years prior to the enactment of the
section 138 amendments. 2r As of year-end 2012, there were a total of forty-three section
138 class actions filed since the introduction of the amendments in 2005, including
17. See NERA 2013, supra note 1; NERA 2011, supra note 4; Steve Tenai and Nicholas Saint-Martin, Recent
Developments in Securities Class Actions in Ontario, 2010 OBA Class Action Colloquium (December 1, 2010),
http://nortonrosefulbright.com/files/recent-developments-in-securities-class- actions-in-Ontario -pdf- 2 72kg-
52205.pdf.
18. Gilles Cuniberti, Securities Class Actions and Extra-territoriality: A View from Canada, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (June 30, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/securities-class-acti6ons-and-extra-territoriality-a-view-
from-canada/.
19. NERA 2013, supra note 1, at 1.
20. MARK L. BERENBLUT, BRADLEY A. HEYS & TARA K. SINGH, TRENDS IN CANADIAN CLASS ACTIONS:
2010 UPDATE: CLIMBING TO NEW HEIGHTS-THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE CASES IS AT ITS HIGHEST (2011)
[hereinafter NERA 2010].
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id. at 1.
23. NERA 2011, supra note 4, at 5.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 25.
26. See NERA 2010, supra note 20.
2 7. In 2012, there were nine new securities class actions filed in Canada, less than the fifteen new cases filed
in 2011. However, eight of these class actions were Bill 198 cases, similar to the nine new cases filed in 2011
and eight new cases in 2010. Id.
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twenty-eight class actions that, as of that date, remained pending. 28 As reflected by the
NERA statistics, the rising trend in Ontario securities class action filings is largely a result
of the section 138 amendments. 29
In 2013, plaintiff-investors filed ten new securities class actions, nine of which involved
section 138 cases with eight of these cases filed in Ontario.3 0 The 2013 NERA report
states that these new filings are "generally in line with the pace of such filings since 2008
[hence continuing] the trend of a higher volume of cases following the coming into force
of the new secondary market civil liability provisions of the provincial securities act since
the end of 2005."31 As of 2013, there have been a total of fifty-two secondary market civil
liability class actions filed, with seventeen cases filly settled and four dismissed. 32
III. Ontario Securities Act
A. ONTARIO SECURITIES ACT AMENDMENTS
In 2002, consistent with a more proactive approach taken by other governments to-
wards restoring investor confidence in their capital markets (such as the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 enacted in the United States), 33 the Ontario government introduced Bill 198,
otherwise known as "An Act to Implement Budget Measures and Other Initiatives of the
Government." 34 Bill 198 made significant amendments to the Ontario Securities Act, in-
cluding Section 126.2, which states:
A person or company shall not make a statement that the person or company knows
or reasonably ought to know, (a) in a material respect and at the time and in the light
of the circumstances tnder which it is made, is misleading or untrne or does not state
a fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make the statement not
misleading; and (b) would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the
market price or value of a security, derivative or underlying interest of a derivative. 35
Additionally, section 126.1 prohibits any company or person from engaging in conduct




29. See generally NERA 2011, supra note 4.
30. NERA 2013, supra note 1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Star. 745 (2002); See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REQ
ULATION 281-301 (6th ed. 2013).
34. H. Garfield Emerson & Geoff A. Clarke, Bill 198 and Ontario's Securities Act: Giving Investors and the
OSC, Added Muscle, FASKEN MARTNEAU, (Nov. 17, 18, 19, 2003), http://www.fasken.com/files/Publication/
4348346f-28f6-4007-b37f-6fe9lca7ff38/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/28e7Ob5f- 89f3 -4684-a7ba-7 e
08688cd5c0/BJLL198.PDF.
35. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 126.2 (Can.). To be actionable, any such
misstatement or onission must be made material. Id. § 126.2. See infra note 42.
36. Id. § 126.1.
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1. Liability
Included in the section 138 amendments are provisions that impose civil liability for
deficient secondary market disclosures. Many of these provisions are investor-friendly. 37
The secondary market liability provisions authorize investors to bring a right of action for
damages if they purchase or sell securities of a publicly-traded issuer in the time frame
during which there is an uncorrected material statement made by such issuer or other
responsible person. 38 Liability also may be levied where a subject issuer fails to timely
disclose a material change.
39
Accordingly, sections 138.3(1) and 138.3(3) provide that where a responsible issuer,40 or
person or company acting with the requisite authority on its behalf,4 1 "releases a docu-
ment that contains a [material] misrepresentation, a person or company who acquires or
disposes of the issuer's security during the period between the time when the document
was released and the time when the misrepresentation contained in the document was
publicly corrected, ' 42 has a right of action for damages against the issuer and other re-
sponsible persons, including its directors, certain officers, influential persons, and ex-
perts. 4 3 Likewise, sections 13 8.3 (2) and 13 8.4(1) state that liability may be imposed based
on a materially misleading "public oral statement",44 irrespective of the plaintiff's reliance
on such statement, against the issuer and specified other responsible parties who acted
with knowing or gross misconduct when that statement related to "the business or affairs
of the responsible issuer . . .45
37. Emerson & Clarke, supra note 34; see STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 138-39. As discussed earlier,
for example, neither reliance nor loss causation need be proven; in "core" documents, the responsible person
has the burden to establish the conducting of a reasonable investigation and having a reasonable belief; and
the pleading requirements are relatively favorable to plaintiffs. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
38. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 126.2 (Can.); Emerson & Clarke, supra note
34.
39. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 126.2 (Can.); Emerson & Clarke, supra note
34.
40. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5. As defined in Section 138.1, a responsible
issuer is defined as: a reporting issuer, or any other issuer with a real and substantial connection to Ontario,
any securities of which are publicly traded." See mnfra note 41.
41. As defined in section 138.1, an influential person, in the context of a responsible issuer, means: a
control person; a promoter; an insider who is not a director or officer of the responsible issuer; or an invest-
ment fund manager, if the responsible issuer is an investment fund." See id.
42. The term materiality encompasses information that "would reasonably be expected to have a significant
effect on the market price or value of a security .. " See id. § 126.2(1)(b).
43. Id. Section 138.3(1) refers to "each director of the responsible issuer at the time the document was
released"; and "each officer of the responsible issuer who authorized, permitted or acquiesced in the release of
the document .... Id. For the definition of influential person, see supra note 41.
44. Id. § 138.3(2).
45. Id. at §§ 138.3(2), 138.4(1). The specified other responsible parties include:
[i] [T]he person who made the public oral statement; [ii] each director and officer of the respon-
sible issuer who authorized, permitted or acquiesced in the making of the public oral statement;
[iii] each influential person, and each director and officer of the influential person, who knowingly
influenced, [a] the person who made the public oral statement to make the public oral statement
or [b] a director or officer of the responsible issuer to authorized, permit or acquiesce in the
making of the public oral statement; and [iv] each expert where, [a] the misrepresentation is also
contained in a report, statement or opinion made by the expert, [b] the person making the public
oral statement includes, summarizes or quotes from the report, statement or opinion of the ex-
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Section 138.1 of the Ontario Securities Act sets forth the definition of "responsible
issuer"; Canadian courts have had occasion to interpret this term. Recently, the Ontario
Court of Appeal, in Abdula v. Canadian Solar Inc.,46 focused on whether Canadian Solar
qualified as a "responsible issuer" under the statute. Canadian Solar's shares do not trade
on any Canadian Stock Exchange. Therefore, Canadian Solar is not a reporting issuer
under the Ontario Securities Act, the first option under the definition of a responsible
issuer found in Section 138.1 of the Ontario Securities Act. 47 Nonetheless, the company
is incorporated in Canada, sells its shares to Canadian investors, and has its principal exec-
utive office located in Ontario.48 The Court of Appeal determined that "an issuer that is
not a reporting issuer [under the Ontario Securities Act], but that has a real and substan-
tial connection to Ontario within the meaning of the [Ontario Securities Act], can consti-
tute a 'responsible issuer', and therefore be subject to a statutory cause of action by
purchasers in the secondary market .... ,,49
Additionally, section 138.3(4) creates liability exposure on a responsible issuer that fails
to make a timely disclosure, as defined under the Act, for the benefit of an investor who
"acquires or disposes of the issuer's security between the time when the material change
was required to be disclosed and the subsequent disclosure of the material change . . .,,0
This statute creates liability for a responsible issuer irrespective of whether the plaintiff
relied on whether such issuer complied with its disclosure requirements.5' Although sec-
tion 138.3(4) eliminates the requirement of reliance, section 138.4(5) does not allow an
investor to recover damages if the plaintiff acquired or disposed of the security with
knowledge that the communication contained a material misrepresentation, or "with
knowledge of the material change."
52
Section 138.4(3) precludes the imposition of liability upon a person or company (but
not for, among others, a responsible issuer or officer of a responsible issuer53 ) who does
not make timely disclosure-unless the plaintiff proves that such person or company knew,
and failed to timely disclose, the material change, or deliberately evaded knowledge of the
change, or was "guilty of gross misconduct" in the failure to timely disclose5 4 But impor-
tantly, section 138.4(4) provides that a plaintiff is not required to prove the foregoing
pert, and [c] if the public oral statement was made by a person other than the expert, the expert
consented in writing to the use of the report, statement or opinion in the public oral statement.
Id. at § 138.3(2).
46. Abdula v. Canadian Solar Inc. (2012) 110 O.R. 3d 256 (Can. Ont. C.A.). One of the authors of this
article, Marc I. Steinberg, was an expert witness in this case.
47. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.1 (Can.).
48. Abdula v. Canadian Solar Inc., 2012 ONCA 211 at para. 3.
49. Id. at 1, 2. See also Silver v. Imax Corp. (2009), 105 O.R. 3d 212 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.) (certifying
global class action consisting of Canadian and non-Canadian investors, regardless whether the subject shares
were purchased on the NASDAQ or TSX); McCann v. CP Ships Ltd., [2009] OJ. No. 5182 (Can. Ont. Sup.
Ct.) (refusing to certify a class comprised of non-Canadian investors where shares were listed on the NYSE
and TSX).
50. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.3(4) (Can.).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 138.4(5).
53. Id. at § 138.4(4). Section 138.4(4) states that a plaintiff does not need to prove the matters described in
section 138.4(3) in relation to a "responsible issuer; an officer of a responsible issuer; an investment fund
manager; or an officer of an investment fund manager." Id.
54. Id. § 138.4(3).
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(e.g., knowing misconduct) in a lawsuit against "a responsible issuer; an officer of a re-
sponsible issuer"; an investment find manager; or an officer of an investment find
manager."55 .
Section 138.4 describes the plaintiffs burden of proof.56 When seeking damages for
non-core documents,5 7 plaintiffs must satisfy a higher burden of proof compared to core
documents where defendants must prove that they conducted a reasonable investigation
and "had no reasonable grounds to believe that the [core] document or public oral state-
ment contained the misrepresentation. "58 In an action brought under section 138.3 re-
garding a non-core document, the plaintiff must prove that the person or company: knew
at the time the document was released that it contained a material misrepresentation;
deliberately avoided inquiring into the document before its release; or was guilty of "gross
misconduct" with respect to the release of the document.5 9 But, the plaintiff is not re-
quired to prove the above if the section 138.3 action involves an expert-defendant.60
Section 138.6(1) provides that when several defendants are found liable, each defendant
will bear proportionate liability, being liable for the portion of the damages that corre-
sponds to its responsibility for such damages. 6 1 But, if the court determines that a defen-
dant "authorized, permitted or acquiesced in the making of the misrepresentation or the
failure to make timely disclosure while knowing it to be a misrepresentation or a failure to
make timely disclosure," the plaintiff may recover the entire amount from such defendant,
regardless of its responsibility level.62 The statute allows a defendant who is ordered to
pay the entire amount to seek contribution from any other defendant found liable in the
action.6 3
2. Damages
Section 138.5(1) outlines the amount of damages recoverable for a complainant who
acquires the issuer's securities in the secondary market after either the making of a public
oral statement, or the release of a document containing a material misrepresentation, or
after the failure to make timely disclosure. 64 With respect to securities "disposed of on or
before the 10th trading day after the public correction of the misrepresentation or the
disclosure of the material change in the manner required under this Act or the regula-
55. Id. § 138.3(4).
56. Id. § 138.4.
57. Id. § 138.1. Non-core documents are those documents that are not defined as a core document. Id. See
supra note 12.
58. Note that this standard, with certain exceptions, applies to public oral statements and failure to make
timely disclosure. See Pritchard & Sarra, supra note 9 at 894.
59. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.4(1) (Can.). Moreover, with respect to
forward-looking information that contains a material misrepresentation, the subject company or person may
avoid liability by proving that: the forward-looking statement contained adequate cautionary language; it set
forth the significant factors or assumptions that were employed; and the defendant "had a reasonable basis for
drawing the conclusions or making the forecasts and projections set out in the forward-looking information."
Id. § 138.4(9).
60. Id. § 138.4(2). Note that this same standard applies to public oral statements. See supra notes 44-45
and accompanying text.
61. Id. § 138.6(1)
62. Id. § 138.6(2)
63. Id. § 138.6(4)
64. Id. § 138.5(1).
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tions," damages will equal the difference between the average price paid for the securities
and the price received upon the sale of the securities.
6
If a plaintiff has not disposed of its securities, damages will be awarded in an amount
similar to the damages awarded for securities disposed of after the tenth trading day.66
The defendant may reduce or eliminate damages otherwise incurred by proving that the
change in the market price of the securities was not caused by the misrepresentation or
failure to timely disclose.67 One benefit of the damages provision is that plaintiffs likely
will not pursue litigation with unrealistic expectations of potential damages, thereby facili-
tating settlement discussions.6s
Section 138.7(1) limits the amount of damages recoverable under Section 138.5, when
"the actual damages assessed are greater than the liability limits."69 Section 138.7(1) limits
damages, in a Section 138.3 action, to the lesser of the total damages levied against the
person or company, and the liability limit for the particular defendant. 70 But other than
for the responsible issuer, there is no limit on damages if the plaintiff can prove that the
subject person or company knowingly "authorized, permitted or acquiesced" in the
wrongdoing.71 Section 138.7(2) focuses on the knowledge requirement, stating that the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant either made the misrepresentation knowingly, or
"influenced the making of the misrepresentation ... while knowing it was a misrepresen-
tation .... ,,72 In this respect, the liability limits found in Section 138.7 may have been
65. Id. If the securities were disposed of after the tenth trading day, damages will be the lesser of: (i) the
average price paid for the shares and the price received upon the sale of the securities; and (ii) the difference
between the average price paid for the securities and the trading price for the ten trading days following
either the public correction of the misrepresentation or disclosure of a material change. Id. See infra note
127.
66. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.5(1) (Can.). See infra note 127. Section
138.5(1)3 provides:
In respect of any of the securities of the responsible issuer that the person or company has not
disposed of, assessed damages shall equal the number of securities acquired, multiplied by the
difference between the average price per security paid for those securities (including any commis-
sions paid in respect thereof determined on a per security basis) and,
i. if the issuer's securities trade on a published market, the trading price of the issuer' securities
on the principal market (as those terms are defined in the regulation) for the 10 trading days
following the public correction of the misrepresentation or the disclosure of the material change
in the manner required under this Act or the regulations, or
ii. if there is no published market, the amount that the court considers just.
Id.
67. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.5(3) (Can.).
68. Andrea Laing & Robert Carson, Whether Common Law Claims for Secomay Market Misrepresentation?:
An Analysis of Certification Decisions in McCann v. CP Ships, Silver v. Imax, McKenna v. Gammon Gold, and
Dobbie v. Arctic Glacier, 7CANADIAN CLASS ACTION REV. 103, 113 (2011), availahle at http://www.osler.com/
uploadedFiles/OurPeople/Profiles/L/CCARo20Volo207 %20Noo201% 20Articleo205 %20(Common
%20Law%20Claims)%2022363379-1%20(3).PDF.
69. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5 § 138.7(1) (Can.).
70. Id. The limits on damages are addressed supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text; infra notes 96-102
and accompanying text.
71. Id. § 138.7(2).
72. Id.
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added to the Securities Act to offset the elimination of the reliance and causation
requirements.7
3
B. PROCESS FOR FILING A CLASS ACTION
Before an investor may pursue a securities class action in Canada, the court must certify
the class. Canadian courts thus serve a gatekeeping function; a class action suit must be
certified before it can proceed, thereby minimizing frivolous claims.74 The Canadian Se-
curities Administration explained the reasoning for requiring leave of the court:
This screening mechanism is designed not only to minimize the prospects of an ad-
verse court award in the absence of a meritorious claim but, more importantly, to try
to ensure that unmeritorious litigation and the time and expense it imposes on de-
fendants, is avoided or brought to an end in the litigation process.75
Notably, in certifying the class in Silver v. Imax Corp., the court opined that the Ontario
Securities Act sets a "relatively low threshold for a plaintiff seeking leave to proceed with
an action."76 This holding may induce investors to more frequently initiate securities class
actions in Ontario. 77 Additionally, the relative flexibility of certifying a securities class
action, as compared to the United States, 7 may induce investors outside Canada to pursue
meritorious class actions based in Ontario.79 Canadian courts have continued to follow
the relatively low threshold set forth in Imax to determine whether to grant leave.8O
Before certifying a class action, a Canadian court thus must assess that the following
criteria are met:
the pleadings disclose a cause of action; that there is an identifiable class of persons
that could be represented; that the claims raise common issues that preferably should
be resolved together; and that there is a representative plaintiff or plaintiffs who
would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class without conflict of
interest and who has a workable plan for advancing the proceedingsI
Judicial consideration of the class action claim occurs when the class files the Leave
Motion.8 2 Section 138.8(1) of the Ontario Securities Act provides that the court will only
73. Laing & Carson, supra note 69, at 107.
74. Pritchard & Sarra, supra note 9, at 886.
75. Recent Developments i1 Securities Class Actions i1 Ontaio, snupra note 17; CSA Notice 53-302 (2000), 23
OSCB 7383 at 7390 [CSA Notice 53-302].
76. Silver v. Imax Corp. (2009), 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 259 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.J.) (Leave to Appeal Decision),
at T 25.
77. EMILY C. COLE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CANADIAN SECURITIES CLASS-ACTION LAW, A.B.A.
SEC. LITIG. J. 13 (2010); CSA Notice 53-302 (2000), 23 OSCB 7383 at 7390 [CSA Notice 53-302].
78. See Gelowitz, supra note 6.
79. Id. Note that the U.S. Supreme Court's continued recognition of the "fraud on the market" theory to
establish a rebuttable presuimption of reliance in Section 10(b) actions under the Securities Exchange Act,
thereby facilitating class certification, signifies that securities class actions will remain a vital part of the U.S.
securities litigation framework. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
80. See, e.g., Gould v. W. Coal Corp. (2012), 221 A.C.W.S. (3d) 789 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.); Dobbie v. Arctic
Glacier Income Fund (2012), 3 C.P.C. (7th) 261 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.).
81. Pritchard & Sarra, supra note 9, at 886-87.
82. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.5 § 138.8(1) (Can.).
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grant leave when it "is (a) satisfied that the action is being brought in good faith; and, (b)
there is a reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved at trial in favor of the
plaintiff."83 In order to assess whether the plaintiff has a "reasonable possibility" to win at
trial, Section 138.8(2) of the Act requires each party to provide an affidavit containing the
material facts upon which it will rely.84
In a number of cases, the good faith requirement has been interpreted to require the
plaintiffs to establish that they are bringing the action in the honest belief that they have a
legitimate and arguable claim, for the purpose of the statutory cause of action, and not for
a secondary or alternative purpose.85 In these cases, it was found that the plaintiffs com-
plied with this standard and thus met the criterion.
8 6
With respect to adherence to the "reasonable possibility" requirement, the Imax court
opined that "there must be something more than a de minimis possibility or chance that
the plaintiff will succeed at trial"8 and that "the adjective 'reasonable' also reminds the
court that the conclusion that a plaintiff has a reasonable possibility of success at trial must
be based on a reasoned consideration of the evidence."88 More recently, in Gould v. [Vest-
ern Coal Corporation, the court endorsed this threshold standard regarding a plaintiff's pos-
sible success at trial.8 9 Applying this standard, the Gould court denied leave.90 In so
holding, the court reasoned that there was not a requisite possibility that the plaintiff's
claims would be successfil.91 The court's decision in Gould represents the first denial for
leave to bring a class action in the secondary securities market setting premised on an
assessment of the merits of the action.92
Additionally, Section 138.14 of the Ontario Securities Act provides limitations on when
a plaintiff may file suit.93 The statute limits the time an action may be commenced to
three years from the making of the misrepresentation or failure to make timely disclo-
sure.
94 Both the leave requirement and the limitations period to file suit restrict to some
extent this statutory right of action.95
83. Id. § 138.8(1); Steinberg et. al., supra note 3, at 138.
84. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.8(2) (Can.).
85. Silver v. Imax Corp. (2009), 105 O.R. 3d 212 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.), at T 308; Cole, supra note 77, at 13.
86. Cole, supra note 77, at 13-14.
87. Silver v. Imax Corp. (2009), 105 O.R. 3d 212 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.), at T 324.
88. Id.
89. Gould v. W. Coal Corp. (2012), 221 A.C.W.S. (3d) 789 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.), 237, 239.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. David Di Paolo & Margot Finley, Strategy for Deftndants Facing a Leave Motion to Commence a Class
Action Under the Securities Act, 8 CANAmAN CLASS ACTION REV. 169 (2013), availahle at http://www.blg.com/
en!NewsAndPublications/Documents/TCCAR_-Strategy-forDefendantsFacing-aLeave Motion to
Commence aClass-Action Under the SecuritiesAct.pdf
93. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.14 (Can.). In the case of a nmisrepresenta-
tion in a document or public statement, investors are barred from filing suit, later than the earlier of (i) three
years after the date of first release of the document, or (ii) date of the public statement, containing the
misrepresentation, or (iii) six months after the issuance of a news release granting leave to commence an
action under Section 138.3 or under similar legislation regarding the same misrepresentation in another
province or territory in Canada. Id.
94. Id. Note that this limitations period is shortened to "six months after the issuance of a news release
disclosing that leave has been granted to commence an action under section 138.3 or other comparable
legislation in another province or territory of Canada [with respect to the alleged violation]."
95. Laing & Carson, supra note 62, at 111.
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C. CAP ON LOSSES
Although the amendments to the Ontario Securities Act provide an easier avenue for
investors to recover damages in the secondary market context, the amendments impose a
cap on the amount recoverable. 96 In the case of a responsible issuer, Section 138.1 of the
Ontario Securities Act states that the cap on damages is the greater of $1 million or 5
percent of the company's market capitalization.s
The liability cap for an individual director, officer, or influential person98 is the greater
of $25,000 or fifty percent of such person's total yearly compensation.99 But except for
the responsible issuer, there is no cap on damages with respect to a subject officer, direc-
tor, influential person, or other subject defendant if it can be proven that such defendant
knowingly authorized, allowed, or acquiesced in the making of the misrepresentation or
the failure to make timely disclosure. 1
The damages cap provides many benefits for Canadian courts in dealing with securities
class actions; however, there are some negative consequences as well:
The damage cap seeks to balance remedies for investors against the desire to protect
and advance capital activity through the protection of officers and other persons.
The limit on damages encourages plaintiffs to focus on actions that likely have merit.
The downside is that it is likely to result in investors recovering less than the full
amount of their losses, absent clear evidence of fraud. Even then, the liability cap for
issuers means that investors are unlikely to recover fill compensation in cases of sig-
nificant fraud. 1 1
Nonetheless, the cases thus far settled indicate that the damages cap has functioned in
the manner the legislature intended: providing meaningful monetary recovery to investors
while limiting what may be perceived as excessive damages.1 2
96. See Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.1.
97. Id. In this regard, Section 138.7(1) also must be considered which provides that the damages payable by
a subject defendant under Section 138.3 is the lesser of:
(a) the aggregate damages assessed against the person or company in the action; and
(b) the liability limit for the person or company less the aggregate of all damages assessed after
appeals, if any, against the person or company in all other actions brought under section 138.3,
and under comparable legislation in other provinces or territories in Canada in respect of that
misrepresentation or failure to make timely disclosure, and less any amount paid in settlement of
any such actions.
Id.
98. Id. § 138.7
99. Id. For experts, liability is capped at the greater of $1 million or "the revenue that the expert and its
affiliates of the expert have earned from the responsible issuer and its affiliates during the 12 months preced-
ing the misrepresentation." Id.
100. Id. § 138.7(2). See STErNBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 139.
101. Pritchard & Sarra, supra note 9, at 905.
102. See id.; see also NERA 2013, supra note 1.
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IV. Morrison Compared to Canadian Solar
In view of the investor-friendly provisions of the Ontario Securities Act, and the con-
trasting holdings in Morrison v. National Australia Bank 1 3 and Canadian Solar, the issue
arises whether U.S. investors will file suit in Canada when the opportunity arises. The
plaintiffs in Morrison were Australian investors who sued an Australian bank in a U.S.
court based on alleged misconduct that occurred in the United States.1 4 The Supreme
Court in Morrison restricted the reach of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to situations
where there is "the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange,
and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States."1O5 Because the plain-
tiffs acquired their securities in Australia, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the
petitioner's claims.106
By contrast, the Ontario Court of Appeals in Canadian Solar allowed the plaintiff-inves-
tors to pursue their claims, even though the Canadian Solar shares were not publicly
traded in Canada, but rather on a U.S. exchange. 1 7 The Ontario Court of Appeals
reasoned:
The subject matter of [the statute] is a remedy to investors for misrepresentation in
certain issuers' secondary market disclosure. In this case, at least some of that disclo-
sure emanated from Ontario. That, together with the relationship of Canadian Solar
to Ontario, constitutes a sufficient connection between Ontario and Canadian Solar
to potentially subject Canadian Solar to a statutory cause of action pursuant to [the
Ontario Securities Act].' 0 8
The Court found the defendants had a sufficient connection to Ontario because the com-
pany was incorporated in Canada, its principal executive office was located in Ontario, the
company held its annual business meeting in Ontario, and the alleged misrepresentations
were contained in documents released in Ontario.1 9
The decision in Canadian Solar is far more investor-friendly when compared to Morri-
son. The Court of Appeals decision in Canadian Solar "clearly signals Canada's willingness
to allow actions against foreign issuers if a real and substantial connection to Canada is
established, and may cause plaintiffs to regard Canada as a viable alternative to the United
States following its decision in Morrison.""0 Some believe that because of Canada's close
proximity to the United States, coupled with the comparatively low standard set forth in
Canadian Solar, "Canada is a natural venue for securities litigation that can no longer be
103. Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
104. Id. at 2872-73.
105. Id. at 2888. The "listing" theory also has been rejected to date. Accordingly, section 10(b) is unavaila-
ble when the subject securityis listed on a U.S. exchange if the purchase or sale occurs on a foreign exchange.
See, e.g. City of Pontiac Policemen's and Firemen's Ret. Sys., 752 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2014). See generally Marc
I. Steinberg & Kelly Flanagan, TrannationalDealings Morrison Continues to Make Waves, 46 INT'L LAW 829
(2012).
106. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888
107. Abdula v. Canadian Solar Inc. (2012), 110 O.R. 3d 256 (Can. Ont. C.A.), at T 2.
108. Id. at T 49.
109. Id. at T 9.
110. Poonam Pur, Securities Litigation and Enforcement: The Canadian Perspective, 37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 967,
1017 (2012).
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conducted in the United States after Morrison.""' The opportunity for U.S. investors to
bring their claims in Ontario when the Section 10(b) action is precluded due to Morrison
should prompt U.S. investors, when feasible, to pursue redress under the Ontario reme-
dial framework.
V. Ontario Securities Class Actions Compared to the United States
In many regards, the Ontario Securities Act is more favorable towards plaintiff-inves-
tors than the United States federal securities laws. The United States securities legislation
most similar to Section 13 8 of the Ontario Securities Act is Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act (Exchange Act) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. To
satisfy the requirements of a Section 10(b) action, plaintiffs must plead and prove several
elements.112 For example, plaintiffs must plead and prove that the defendant acted with
scienter, "which is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.""
The pleading requirement sets forth a rigorous standard for plaintiffs to hurdle, the failure
of which results in the dismissal of the action.1 4 By contrast, a Section 138 pleading may
be established without alleging scienter; moreover, the pleading requirements are far more
relaxed.15 In this respect, all that is required in a secondary market class action in Onta-
rio under Section 138, with respect to "core" documents, is the occurrence of an alleged
material misrepresentation or failure to correct such a misrepresentation-unless the com-
pany, its officers, and its directors reasonably believed, after conducting a reasonable in-
vestigation, that the representation was accurate.1 16 By not requiring investor-plaintiffs
ordinarily to prove scienter, Ontario courts have provided an easier avenue to recover
damages.
Another important difference involves the requirement of reliance. In a Section 10(b)
cause of action, Section 10(b) generally requires a finding of reliance on the alleged mis-
representation (although recognition of the "fraud-on-the-market" theory to establish a
111. Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law
After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 97 MINN. L. REv. 132, 186 (2012).
112. A private action under Section 10(b) requires a plaintiff to establish the following:
* Requisite jurisdictional means
* Status as purchaser or seller of the securities






MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 261-63 (6th ed. 2014).
113. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trad-
ing, SEC Rel. No. 34-43154 (Aug. 21, 2000).
114. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 551 U.S. 308 (2007). See Marc I. Steinberg, Pleading Securities
Fraud Claims Only Part of the Story, 45 Loy. U. CHi. LJ. 603 (2014).
115. Emerson & Clarke, supra note 34; see generally Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5
(Can.).
116. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.); STErNBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 138;
supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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rebuttable presumption of reliance alleviates this burden in an efficient market). 117 This
requirement poses an additional obstacle before a plaintiff can recover damages. By con-
trast, under the Ontario Securities Act, Section 138 provides investors with a deemed
reliance feature, providing an investor the right to sue "without regard to whether the
person or company relied on the misrepresentation .... ,"118 The deemed reliance feature
lowers the burden for an investor to recover damages.11 9 Moreover, Section 10(b) does
not differentiate between categories of disclosure; for instance, oral statements and press
releases generally are treated the same as documents filed with the SEC.
2 0
The Securities Exchange Act also differs from Section 138 of the Ontario Securities Act
regarding the elements of loss causation and damages. Under Section 21D(b)(4) of the
Exchange Act, a plaintiff carries the burden of proving loss causation and damages. 12
Section 21D(b)(4) provides: "In any private action arising under this title, the plaintiff
shall have the burden of proving that the [defendant's violative] act or omission ... caused
the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages."122 Section 138 of the Ontario
Securities Act differs from the Exchange Act by placing the burden on the defendant to
prove that the losses were not caused by its misconduct. 12 3 Section 138.5(3) states that
damages shall not include any amount the defendant can prove is "unrelated to the mis-
representation or the failure to make timely disclosure."124 Therefore, the defendant must
prove that the damages are unrelated to the misrepresentation, unlike the United States'
requirement that the plaintiff must establish that the damages are caused by the misrepre-
sentation. This difference illustrates how Section 138 of the Ontario Securities Act is
more beneficial to plaintiffs than the Exchange Act.
Although in many regards Section 138 of the Ontario Securities Act is friendlier to-
wards plaintiff-investors than the U.S. Exchange Act, Ontario's ceiling on damages is one
drawback. As described above, Section 138 provides for a ceiling on damages, where
plaintiffs may only recover (from a company) the greater of $1 million dollars or 5 percent
of the company's market capitalization, and from an individual director, officer, or influ-
ential person, the greater of $25,000 or fifty percent of such person's total yearly compen-
sation. 25 Significantly, Section 138 does not limit the amount of damages that may be
imposed upon such individual if he/she knew about the misrepresentation. 12 6 Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act does not impose such a ceiling for damages, a benefit for plain-
tiff-investors in the United States compared to Ontario. Note, however, that the Ex-
117. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (upholding rebuttable
presumption of reliance under fraud on the market theory); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988)
(adopting fraud on the market theory to provide a rebuttable presumption of reliance).
118. Emerson & Clarke, supra note 34; see generally, Province of Ontario Securities Act. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5
(Can).
119. Emerson & Clarke, supra note 34.
120. See Pritchard & Sarra, supra note 9, at 905.
121. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78(a) (2012)). See
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
122. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at §21D(b)(4).
123. See Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.3(1) (Can.).
124. Id. § 138.5(3).
125. Id. § 138.1
126. Id. § 138.7.
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change Act does set forth a formula determined by market price that acts as a limitation on
a plaintiff's maximum recovery.
27
But this seeming benefit may be overrated as recovery may be obtained in a Section
10(b) action only if such elements as scienter and loss causation are proven. Looked at in
this fashion, if scienter (i.e., knowledge) is established in an Ontario secondary market
case, the cap on damages would be inapplicable with respect to, among others, the respon-
sible officers and directors.128 Additionally, NERA reports that the median settlement
amount for a securities class action lawsuit in the U.S. in 2013 was $9.1 million, compared
to a median settlement amount of $8.6 million in Canada.' 29 The close proximity in me-
dian settlement supports the proposition that, while the damages cap seemingly provides a
benefit to Canadian defendants, the actual benefit in reality is smaller.
VI. Conclusion
As discussed above, Section 138 of the Ontario Securities Act is favorable towards inves-
tor-plaintiffs because it creates causes of action for plaintiffs and flexible requirements for
courts to certify a class. The favorable rules found in Section 138 help to explain why
there has been an increase in securities class actions in Canada, and more specifically
Ontario. Additionally, the statistics found in the NERA yearly reports indicate that secur-
ities class actions filed in Canada have sharply increased since 2005, when Section 138 was
introduced. The NERA reports opine that the recent secondary market liability provi-
sions are a chief cause for the increase in securities class actions filed in Canada, and
specifically Ontario.13 Additionally, NERA reports that as of 2013, the thirty-one active
Section 138 cases total more than $16 billion in total claims,131 a significant amount that
should incentivize plaintiff-investors to seek recompense.
Because of the plaintiff-friendly provisions found in the Ontario Securities Act, com-
bined with favorable court decisions, U.S. investors will likely seek to litigate fiture claims
that have a sufficient nexus to Canada in the Canadian courts. Moreover, court decisions
that certify a global class will shape fiture litigation in Canada. Due to these develop-
ments, securities class actions in Canada (and particularly Ontario) should remain vibrant
and may well provide a forum for adequate redress for non-Canadian investors in appro-
priate cases. It indeed is an interesting shift that today the Ontario securities laws provide
127. Securities Exchange Act, § 2 1D(e) (setting forth a limitation or "cap" on damages, using the difference
between the price that was paid for the security by the purchaser or seller and the security's average price
during the 90 days following the date that the corrective disclosure was made). See Julia Pashin, The PSLRA
Cap on Securities Fraud Damages: AnI Empirical Evaluation of the 90-Day "Bounce-Back," 41 SEC. REQ. L.J. 169
(2013). By contrast, the Ontario Securities Act provides a damages formula, using a ten trading day period.
See § 138.5. Section 138.5 "provides a damages formula for three different scenarios, when the plaintiff: (1)
sells the stock within the first 10 trading days of the corrective disclosure, (2) sells the stock after the first 10
trading days have passed, and (3) continues to hold the stock." Pashin, 41 SEC. REQ. LJ. at 173. See supra
notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
128. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.).
129. Canadian Securities Class Actions Steady in 2013, According to NERA Economics Consulting Report, NERA,
http://www.nera.com/news-events/press-releases/2014/canadian-securities-class-action-steady-in-2013-ac-
cording-to-ne.html (Feb. 19, 2014).
130. See NERA 2011, supra note 4.
131. See NERA 2013, supra note 1.
SUMMER 2014
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
32 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
in many instances better investor recompense than Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act.
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